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Abstract 
The Dempster-Shafer theory of evidence has 
been used intensively to deal with uncer­
tainty in knowledge-based systems. How­
ever the representation of uncertain rela­
tionships between evidence and hypothesis 
groups (heuristic knowledge) is still a major 
research problem. This paper presents an ap­
proach to representing such heuristic knowl­
edge by evidential mappings which are de­
fined on the basis of mass functions. The re­
lationships between evidential mappings and 
multivalued mappings, as well as between ev­
idential mappings and Bayesian multi- val­
ued causal link models in Bayesian theory are 
discussed. Following this the detailed pro­
cedures for constructing evidential mappings 
for any set of heuristic rules are introduced. 
Several situations of belief propagation are 
discussed. 
1 INTRODUCTION 
In the design and implementation of expert systems 
and decision making systems, the problem of uncertain 
knowledge and evidence has to be solved. Several ap­
proaches can be used to deal with this problem, such as 
Mycin's certainty factors, Prospector's inference nets, 
fuzzy sets, Bayesian nets and Dempster-Shafer's belief 
functions. Generally speaking, there are two kinds of 
problem involving uncertainty: one is caused by uncer­
tain evidence; another is caused by uncertain knowl­
edge, i.e. heuristic knowledge. The former is a re­
sult of ill-defined concepts in the observation, or due 
to inaccuracy and poor reliability of the instruments 
used to make the observations. The latter is a. result 
of weak implication which occurs when the expert or 
model builder is unable to establish a strong correla­
tion between premise (or evidence) and conclusion (or 
hypotheses) (Bonissone and Tong 1985). 
The Dempster-Shafer theory of evidence provides a 
flexible approach to representing uncertain evidence. 
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This theory, which is claimed as an generalization of 
Bayesian inference (Shafer 1976, 1981), has the advan­
tages of representing ignorance of evidence and nar­
rowing the hypothesis space as a result of evidence 
accumulation. Several AI implementations have been 
undertaken (Laskey et al 1989, Lowrance et al 1986, 
Strat 1987, Wesley 1988, Yen 1989, Zarley et al 1988) 
based on the theory or extended versions of the theory 
(Laskey and Lehner 1989; Yen 1989). In this paper we 
argue that it is difficult to represent uncertain heuris­
tic knowledge in this theory; however in most complex 
domains, heuristic knowledge plays an important role 
in solving problems. 
Consider the following piece of heuristic knowledge: if 
X is X1, then Y is Y1 with a degree of belief r1. If 
we get a piece of evidence which says that X is X1 
with a degree of a1, by invoking this rule we should 
be able to obtain the corresponding degree y1 for Y 
is Y1. Certainly the value of Yl must be a function F 
of a1 and r1 (i.e. y1 = F(a1, r1) ) . More generally, we 
suppose that a set of heuristic rules R includes: 
R1: if E1 then H11 with a degree of belief ru; 
H12 with a degree of belief r12i 
R2: if E2 then H21 with a degree of belief r21i 
H22 with a degree of belief r22i 
(1) 
where E1, E2, .•• ,En are values (or propositions) of the 
variable E, and E, is called an antecedent of rule .Rt. A 
H&i in rule� is a subset of the values (or propositions) 
of the variable H and it is called one of the conclusions 
of rule �- A r;,- is called a rule strength. 
Assume we have a piece of evidence which says that E1 
is confirmed with a1, E2 is confirmed with a2, ••. , En 
is confirmed with an, how can we solve the following 
problems: 
• what conditions should L:, eli satisfy? 
• what conditions should 2:; r&,- satisfy? 
• what is the function F to determine h,,-(the degree 
of belief on H1;) from those � and r1;? 
• if more than one set of rules is invoked and the 
same conclusion H1; is obtained, what will be the 
final degree of belief on Ha; from those h0;, ••• , h�o1? 
Generally, if the variable E is a Cartesian product 
of variables A, B, ... , C, that is each E, is in a form 
of (A, andBiand ... andCk), assuming we know the 
evidence for A, B, ... , C, then 
• what is the function F' to determine the degree 
of belief on the premise (A; andBi and ... andC,.)? 
These problems have been modelled in fuzzy the­
ory using a fuzzy extension of modal logic, based on 
Zadeh's concepts of necessity and possibility (Prade 
1981). They were also solved in Mycin's certainty fac­
tor model {Shortliffe and Buchanan 1976). Can these 
problems be solved in Dempster-Shafer theory? 
In this paper we analyze these problems and propose 
our approaches for solving them by extending the the­
ory of evidence. The paper is organized as follows. 
In section 2 the basics of Dempster- Shafer theory are 
introduced and the approach for representing heuris­
tic knowledge by evidential mappings is described in 
which a matrix is used to represent the uncertain rela­
tionships between evidence and conclusions. In section 
3 the relations between Bayesian inference and evi­
dential mappings are examined in which it is proved 
that the multi-valued causal links between hypotheses 
space H and evidence space E (Pearl 1988) in Bayesian 
thec,ry is consistent with the special case of evidential 
mappings. In section 4 the method of constructing a 
complete evidential mapping matrix for an evidential 
mapping of a heuristic rule is discussed. In section 5 
belief propagation approaches are discussed for differ­
ent situations. Finally a conclusion is given along with 
some consideration of related work. 
2 REPRESENTING HEURISTIC 
KNOWLEDGE IN D-S THEORY 
The Dempster-Shafer theory of evidence (which is 
also called the theory of belief functions (Smets 1988, 
Shafer 1990}} provides an alternative approach to 
drawing plausible conclusions from uncertain and in­
complete evidence. It is a generalization of the 
Bayesian theory of subjective probability, it is more 
flexible, and it allows us to derive degrees of belief for 
a question from probabilities of a related question. 
2.1 THE BASICS OF D-S THEORY 
Suppose e is a finite set, which consists of mutually 
exclusive and exhaustive propositions of a problem or 
all values of a variable, 28 is the set of all subsets of e. 
A function Bel: 28 ----+[0, 1] is called a belief function 
in Shafer {1976}, if it satisfies the following conditions: 
1. Bel(0) = 0; 2. Bel(e) = 1; 
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3. for every positive integer n and every collection 
A�, ... , An of subsets of e, 
Bel(At u ... u An);::: E. Bel( As)- E.<,. Bel( A, n 
Ai) + -... + (-1)n+l Bel(A1 n ... nAn) 
Such a set e is called a frame of discernment. By 
knowing a belief function on a frame of discernment, 
another function m can be calculated as: 
where lA- Bl denotes the number of elements in the 
set of A- B. 
The function m is called a basic probability as­
signment {bpa) or a mass function. Obviously a 
mass function has the features that m(0) = 0 and 
L m(A} = 1 for all subsets A of e. A subset A 
is called a focal element of the belief function Bel 
if m{A) > 0. Recovering the belief function Bel 
from a mass function m is carried out by Bel(B) = 
EA£B m(A). 
H all the focal elements of a belief function are single­
tons of e, then the corresponding mass function m is 
a Bayesian subjective probability distribution. 
A belief function {or a mass function) on a frame e 
can either be directly obtained from a piece of evi­
dence or calculated from a probability measure P on 
the related frame T by a mu.ltivalu.ed mapping r be­
tween T and e (Dempster 1967), that is a multivalued 
mapping r assigns each element tofT to a subset A 
of e. The impact of several belief functions (or mass 
functions) on the same frame of discernment is ob­
tained by using Dempster's rule of combination which 
treats Bayesian conditioning probabilities as a special 
case (Shafer 1976). Dempster's rule of combining two 
belief functions Belt and Bel2 can be defined by a rel­
atively simple rule in terms of the corresponding mass 
functions m1 and mz. 
m(C) = EAnB-c 
ml(A)m::�:(B) 
1- :tAnB=I m1(A)m2(B) 
This rule requires that the combined belief functions 
(or their mass functions) are independent. This condi­
tion has been further enhanced as DS-independent in 
Voorbraak (1991). 
2.2 REPRESENTING HEURISTIC 
KNOWLEDGE IN D-S THEORY 
It is obvious that a heuristic rule like {if X is X1 then 
Y is Y1 with a degree of belief r1 } cannot be directly 
represented in D-S theory. Some work concerning this 
topic was carried out previously (Ginsberg 1984, Yen 
1988, Liu 1986, Hau and Kashyap 1990). We pro­
pose that evidential mappings which are defined on 
the basis of mass functions can be used to represent 
the uncertain relationships between evidence and con­
clusions. 
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Definition 1 An e'l.lidential mapping is the mapping 
from one frame of discernment to another, which rep­
resents causal link! among elements of two frames of 
discernment in the form of mass functions. Formally 
an evidential mapping from frame 9E to frame aH is 
I . r· a 2eH><fD,l) Th . 1 � a unctson : E ---+ 2 . e &mage o eacn 
element in 9 E, denoted by f* ( ei), is a collection of 
subset-mass pairs: 
f*(e;) = {(Hu, f(e,- H,l)), ... , (H;m, f(e,- H;m))} 
and let a, = u�l H;; (H,,. s; e H) 
that satisjUs t�e following conditions: 
a. H;; ':/; 9 j=1, ... , m  
b. f(e; -a,,.) > 0 j = 1, ... , m  
c .  E,.(e,- a,,.) = 1 
There is a set of heuristic rules, denoted as R, related 
to an evidential mapping, each of which is in the form 
of�: 
e,---+ Hit (J(e;-+H;l}); . . . ; e; ---+ H;m (J(e;-H;m))· 
A rule states that if e, is true then the truth of the 
problem carried by eH is in Hil with the degree of 
belief f(e, - H,!) exactly committed to H;1, .. . , in 
Him with the degree of belief f(e, - Hsm) exactly 
committed to Him. The e; is called the antecedent of 
rule � and it is an element of a E. Hoi is called one of 
the conclusions of rule B., and it is a subset of 9 H. We 
name aE and 9H as antecedent frame and conclusion 
frame of R respectively. f(e, - H,,.) represents our 
belief exactly on a,,. given condition e,, and it is in 
the range of [0,1]. 




{en} mnl t'nn2 ... fflnl 
The size of matrix M is n X l where n is the number of 
elements in eE and l equals I28NI- 1 (except 0). H; 
is a subset of the elements of e H. For any a,,. appear­
ing in (H,,., f(e, - H,,.)) there is H�e where H�e = H,3. 
The (i, k)-th entry of M is defined as m,:,. which equals 
f(e; - H,,.) if the pair (H,,., f(e; - H,;)) is an ele­
ment of f*(e,) and H,. = H;;; otherwise m,:,. equals 
0. Thus those m,:1, m,:2, .. . , m.:1 of line i must satisfy 
the condition E,. m,:i = 1. More precisely based on 
m.:1, m.:2, ... , m.:1, we define a function m,:. In fact m,: 
is a mass function on 9 E X 9 H, with its focal elements 
as A;1 = {(x, Y)lx E ...,{e,} or y E H,I}, ... , Aim = 
{(x, y)lx E ...,{ei } or y E H;m} and m,:(A,,.) = m.:; for 
j = 1, ... , l. So there are in total n mass functions on 
frame eE X aH. But we define that the combination 
of any two of the above mass functions is meaningless. 
In order to identify each row and column in M we call 
H,. the title of column k, { e,} the title of row i. We also 
call [{ei}, {e2}, ... , {en}] and [H1, H2, ... , 9] the row ti­
tle 'l.lector and column title 'llector of M respectively. 
When we mention a matrix M of an evidential map­
ping, we assume the row title vector and the column 
title vector are known. Thus for any given evidential 
mapping the related heuristic rule set and the matrix 
are unique. 
An evidential mapping from e E to e H states that for 
two related questions represented by 9 E and 9 H, if 
the truth for the question represented by 9 E is e0 then 
the truth for the question represented by 9H is in a 
set a,' but e, has different inter relationships with dif­
ferent subsets of e,. The f(e, - H;;) is used to reflect 
the sensitivity or strength of interrelation between e, 
and H,,-. Certainly the total strength should be 1. 
Example 1: H an evidential mapping r• specifies 
mapping from an evidence space a E to a hypothesis 
space 6H as: 
r*(ei) = {({al,a2},0.7), ({as,a.},0.3)} 
r•(e2) = { ({a2,as},0.8) , (9H, 0 .2)} 
r•(es) = {({a4, as},0.9), (8H,O.l)} 
and a related set of heuristic rules is 
R: e1---+ {a1,a2} (0.7)i 
e2---+ {a2,as} (o.s); 
e3---+ {a4, as} (0.9); 
e1 ---+ {a3, a4} (O.S)· 
e2---+ eH (o.2J· 
e3 ---+ 8H (0.1)· 
where 9E = {el, e2, e3} and aH = {al, a21 as, a4, as}, 
then the matrix M has 2s - 1 columns, most of which 
have only zero m,:i such as columns {al}, {a1, a2, a3}. 
Usually a matrix becomes too big when eH contains 
several elements. So we delete all those columns which 
have only zero m.:; and form another matrix. We call 
such a simplified matrix the Basic Matrix and denote 
it as BM. Thus the title vector of a basic matrix of 
an evidential mapping only contains those H;; which 
appear in r• ( ei}. The BM of this evidential mapping 

























with row title vector [ { e1 }, { e2}, { es}] and column title 
vector [{a1, a2}, {a2, as}, {as, a,}, {a,, as}, 9n ]. 
Obviously, multivalued mappings in section 2.1 and 
Bayesian multi-valued causal link models (Pearl 1988} 
can all be represented using such evidential mappings. 
Corollary 1 If all the m;3 in a basic matrix BM of an 
e'l.lidential mapping from a E to 9 H are either 1 or 0 
then the evidential mapping is a multivalued mapping. 
For any e,, the mas8 function m,: on eE X eH is a 
simple support function with. a focal element At,.(A1; = 
{(x,y)lx E ...,{e,} or y E H,,.}), and m,:(A,,.) = 1. 
Corollary 2 If a basic matrix BM has jeH I columns, 
and the titles of all columns are singletons of 8H then 
th� evid�ntial mapping from 8E to 8H of thi11 matrix 
is �xactly a Bayesian multi-valued causal link model. 
For any e,, the mau function l7l1 on as X en is a 
Bayesian probability distribution. We refer to thi.s kind 
of �vidential mappings as Bayesian evidential map­
pings. 
If a piece of evidence gives a probability distribution P 
on e E I then a new function m on e H can be calculated 
by the evidential mapping from 8 E to 8 H: 
m(HJc) = Ei P(ei) x Tnik = Ei P(e;) X f (e; - H1c) 
(When Hk is the title of a column) (2) 
m(H.�o) = 0 Otherwise 
The function m is a basic probability assignment in 
the hypothesis space and has the following features: 
1) m{0) = 0 and 2) Ek m(Hk) = 1 where Hk s; e. 
This can be proved by the following according to def­
inition 1, probability distribution P and features of a 
mass function. 
Corollary 3 A function m is a mass function on 
frame 8 H if it is given by formula £ und�r the con­
dition that P is a probability distribution on space 9 E 
and f* is an evidential mapping from 8 E to 9 n. 
The theoretical support of the formula (2) is Bayes' 
formula 
P(A) = L P(AIB;.)P(B;.) 
• 
where B, is an element of an exhaustive and mutually 
exclusive event set (Pearl 1988). 
We suppose that any evidence e giving P(B;./e) has 
no effect on P(AjB,). This rule is also called Jeffrey's 
rule of conditioning (Jeffrey 1965, Shafer 1981). 
2.3 CREATING EVIDENTIAL MAPPINGS 
FOR INCOMPLETE HEURISTIC 
RULE SETS 
We have seen in the above section that an evidential 
mapping can be associated with a set of heuristic rules. 
The other way around, given a set of heuristic rules in 
the form of (1), if all the antecedents of rules can form 
a frame of discernment 9 E, all the conclusions of rules 
can form another frame of discernment 8 n, and for 
any heuristic rule R;, the sum of r;.; (for j = 1, .. , m) 
is 1, then an evidential mapping can be established 
between 9s and 9n. Unfortunately, the antecedents 
(or conclusions) of a set of rules normally cannot form 
a. frame of discernment which is mutually exclusive and 
exhaustive and usually the sum of r1; for rule R; is less 
than 1. For example if there is only one rule in a set of 
Representing Heuristic Knowledge in D-S Theory 185 
heuristic rules: if X is X 1 then Y i.s Y1 with a degree 
of belief r1. then the antecedent {X i.s X!) itself does 
not form a frame of discernment at all nor does the 
conclusion (Y is YI). 
Definition 2 If at least one of the antecedent frame 
and conclusion frame of a heuri.stic rule set R is not a 
frame of ducernment or there i.9 a rule R;, in rule set R 
where Ei f'ij < 1, then we define such a heuristic rule 
set as an incomplete heuristic: rule set. Otherwise 
we call it a complete heuristic rul� set. 
Corollary 4. Giv�n an incomplete heuristic rule set 
R, let E={e1, ••• , en} represent the antecedent set, and 
H ={hi, ... , h,..} represent the conclusion set of R, 
• if E is not a frame of discernment then define 
en+l = -.(el v .. . Yen) and es = {en+d u E; 
otherwise define eE =E. 
• if H is not a frame of di.scernment then define 
hrn+l = ...,(hl v ... v h,..) and eH = {h,..+!} u H; 
otherwise d�fine en = H. 
• if t!n+l exi3t.S th�n add the rule Rn+1 : (en+l --+ 
eH (1)) to rule set R. 
Then e E and e H are two frames of discernment repre­
senting th� anteced�nt frame and the conclusion frame 
of R respectively. 
Corollary & For each rule R; in R, if E. ro; < 1 
then we add an extra conclusion Sn with be?ief r;h = 
(1- E; r;i) to R;.. That is, 'f the original R;, is 
R; :  e;.----+ Hil (ril)i •.. ; e;--+ H;,.,. (r;,.)· 
then a new R; is 
Ri: e,----+ HH (rH)i •.. ;e.:--+ H.:m. (r;,.)i 
e, --+ eH (r;l>) where r;.h = 1- E,. rii· 
Now the heuristic rule set R is complete and an evi­
dential mapping from e E to en can be created. In 
fact the added part of a rule represents our ignorance. 
In other words, based on the current knowledge of a 
specific domain, we have no knowledge to identify any 
more ad-hoc relationships among elements of reasons 
and results. 
Example 2: Suppose we have a rule set R which 
consists of a rule as follows: 
Smoke alarm is ringing -- There is a fire (o.g)· 
Constructing eE 
={( smoke alarm is ringing), 
not(smoke alarm is ringing)} , Sn ={( there is a fire), 
not(there is a fire)} based on corollary 4, and a new 
rule set R' based on corollary 5 and R' has: 
R1: Smoke alarm is ringing ---There is a fire (O.!l)i 
Smoke alarm is ringing -- en (0.1). 
Rz: Not (Smoke alarm is ringing) ----+ eH (I). 
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This rule set can be associated with an evidential map­
ping from 9& to eH. In particular, if eH is the same 
as e E then the corresponding evidential mapping rep­
resents self-relations of 9& (it is also called delta-9& 
compatibility relation by Lowrance et al (1986)). Now 
we can represent any heuristic rule set (either com­
plete or incomplete) in the Dempster-Sha.fer theory of 
evidence by the means of evidential mappings. In the 
following we simply use a triple (R, 8E, 9H) to repre­
sent an evidential mapping where R is a heuristic rule 
set, e E is the antecedent frame of discernment of R 
and eH is the conclusion frame of discernment of R. 
3 THE RELATION BETWEEN 
EVIDENTIAL MAPPINGS AND 
BAYESIAN CONDITIONAL 
PROBABILITIES 
The Dempster-Sha.fer theory of evidence as an gener­
alization of Bayesian inference includes two meanings: 
mass functions are the general form of Bayesian sub­
jective probabilities in representing evidence; Bayesian 
conditional probabilities are a special case of Demp­
ster's rule of combination (Shafer 1976). Pearl 
(1988) gave general formula to calculate posterior­
probabilities (on hypotheses) or predict future events 
in multi-valued causal link models of Bayesian the­
ory when a set of evidence (for evidence variable) is 
given. In fact, Pearl's work is the extension of tradi­
tional Bayesian inference theory to the situation when 
the relationships among elements of an evidence space 
and a hypothesis space are multi-valued causal map­
pings. In this section we prove that Bayesian inference 
pedormed on multi-valued causal link models can be 
carried out in D-S theory by using evidential map­
pings. 
3.1 PREDICTING FUTURE EVENTS IN 
D-S THEORY 
Example 3: Let S be a variable for "alarm sound" 
and D for "a person's call". If we use the same capital 
letter to represent both a variable name and the name 
of the frame which includes all the values of the vari­
able, we have S= {alarm on, alarm off} and D={ a 
person will call, a person will not call} each of which 
represents an exhaustive and mutually exclusive set of 











P(G.) = L P(d.:lsi)P(si) (3) 
j 
which is a shorthand notation for the statement 
P(d.: I e)= L P(d.:lsi, e)P(s; I e) 
i 
where G. is an element of D and s,- is an element of S 
and we assume that a piece of evidence has no effect 
on the causal link between S and D. Given a prob­
ability distribution of a piece of evidence on S, the 
probabilities on D can be calculated from formula {3). 
Suppose P(st=on)=0.2686, P(s2=off)=0.7314, 
then P(dt = will call) = L:3- P(dt I s;)P(si) 
= [0.2686,0.7314] X [ �:� ] = 0.188 (4). 
This is called predict future events by Pearl in Bayesian 
inference. Obviously the causal link above forms 
an evidential mapping from S to D in Dempster­
Shafer theory. In the condition of prior probabili­
ties P(sl = on) = 0.2682, P(s2 = off) = 0.7314, 
applying formufa (2) we get a mass function on D 
which is the same as that showed in formula (4). 
m(dl) = L;P(s;) X /(s;--+ {ch}) 
= 
0.2686 X 0.7 + 0.7314 X 0.0 = 0.188 
m(d2) = L; P(s;) x f(s;--+ {d2}) 
= 0.2686 X 0.3 + 0.7314 X 1.0 = 0.812 
In Bayesian multi-valued causal link models, the 
causal link between the hypothesis space H and the ev­
idence space E is identified by a nx m matrix M, where 
n and m are the numbers of values of H and E respec­
tively, and the (i, i)-th entry of M isM.:; = P(e,- I h,) 
(Pearl 1988). 
It is easy to see (corollary 3) that the causal link model 
above is consistent with the special case of evidential 
mappings. The mass function on D obtained from 
formula (2) is exactly the same as the probability dis­
tribution on D obtained in Bayesian inference. 
3.2 CALCULATING POSTERIOR 
PROBABILITIES IN D-S THEORY 
Furthermore, in Bayesian multi-valued causal link 
models, given a prior probability distribution on hy­
pothesis space H, causal link matrix M with M.:; = 
P(e,- I h.;) 
{et} {e2} {em} 
{hl} p(e1 I ht} p{e2 1 ht) ... p(e,.. I h1) {h2} p(e1 h2) p(e2 h2) .. . p{em h2) 
{hn} p(el I hn) p(e2 I hn) ··· p(em I hn) 
=M 
and a set of evidence e1, e2, ••• ,eN on evidence space 
E, then posterior-probability P(h, I e1, e2 , ••• ,eN) on 
h.; of His: 
P(h.: I e1, e2, ... , eN) = aP(e1, e2, ••• , eN I h.:)P(h.;) (5) 
where a= [P(e1,e2, ... ,eN)]-1 is a normalizing con­
stant to be computed by requiring that Eq. (5) sum 
to unity. Assuming el, e2, ... , eN are independent with 
each other and conditional independence of respect to 
each h;, Pearl (1988) indicated that , 
P(h;l e1,e2, ••• ,eN) = aP(hi)[IIf=1P(ek I h;)] (6) 
Here we should make it clear that Pearl assumes 
that for each piece of evidence e" there exists an el· 
ement e3 in E where p(e3) = 1 given by e" so that 
P(e" I h.) = P(ei I �). Can these posterior prob-­
abilities be calculated in D·S theory using evidential 
mappings based on the above causal link matrix under 
these assumptions? The following theorem indicates 
that they can. 
Theorem 1 1 .Ld E and H be two frames of discern­
ment, r• be a Bayesian evidential mapping from H 
to E, BM be the basic matrix of the mapping r• with 
(i,:i)-th entry as p(ei I hi). Assume the prior proba­
bility on h, of H is p(h,), a set of evidence on E is 
e1, e2, ... , eN for each of which. there exist! an e1 where 
p(e1) = 1 .  Then the final belief function Bel on H 
using D-S theory is 
Bel(h,) = ap(h,)[IIf=1p(e" I�)] (7) 
n 
where a= (�)p(h,)[IIf=1p(e" I h,)]))-1 
1 
and p(e" I h.) = p(e1 I h,) for each k when the evidence 
ek makes p(e1) = 1. 
4 CONSTRUCTING COMPLETE 
EVIDENTIAL MAPPING 
MATRICES TO PROPAGATE 
MASS FUNCTIONS FROM AN 
EVIDENCE SPACE eE TO A 
HYPOTHESIS SPACE 9n 
In Dempster-Shafer theory a miltivalued mapping is 
used to calculate a mass function on a frame based 
on either a probability distribution or a mass function 
on another frame (Lowrance et al 1 986, Zarley 1 988, 
Laskey et al 1 989) . What we have assumed in the pre­
vious two sections is that a piece of evidence on an 
evidence space (a frame of discernment 9 E) is repre­
sented in the form of Bayesian subjective probabilities. 
A mass function on e H will be obtained based on the 
probability distribution on 9E through an evidential 
mapping from 9 E to 9 H. 
In section 2, we gave the definition of evidential map­
pings. Let e E and e H be two frames of discernment, 
r· be an evidential mapping from e E to e H. As­
suming a piece of evidence indicates that m(E) = 
p, m(9E) = 1 - p, E is a subset of eE, what is the 
impact of the evidence on eH? Obviously the impact 
of the evidence on 9 H is easy to be got if f* is a mul­
tivalued mapping. But it is not so easy when r• is an 
evidential mapping. 
1The proof of this theorem and other theorem, exam­
ples, and further discussion about evidential mappings and 
related work are given in the full version of the paper which 
is available on request (Liu et al1992). 
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In this section, we introduce the approach to con­
structing complete evidential mapping matrices be­
tween two frames. A complete evidential mapping ma­
trix between two frames allows the propagation of a 
mass function from one frame to another. 
Definition 3 Iff* is an evidential mapping from eE 
to e HI BM is the basic matrix of r· with J'Tii  as its 
{i,i}-th entry, the titles of rows of BM are {e1}1 ••• 1 
{en} � eE, the titles of columns of BM are A11 • • •  1 
Am � eH I then a matrix is called a complete eviden­
tial mapping matrix of BM, denoted as CEM, if it is 
defined as: 
1. all the subsets of 9 E except 0 are titles of rows of 
CEM and { ei} 1 • •• 1 {en} are the first n row titles; A11 
••• 1 Am are the titles of the first m columns of GEM. 
f. the J'Tii  of BM is the value of {i, i}-th entry of CEM 
and denoted as m�i· 
9. for a row l with the title E, and l > n , suppose 
E = { e11, e12 ••• , e111J, then {l, i}-tk entry of CEM is 
m13 = (mlli + m12i + ... + mld)/k if all m1;; ::j:. 0 
for i = 1 ,  ... k m13 = 0 otherwise 
4. for m1i = 0, create a column r with the title Ar 
let Ar = U;El; for i= it, ... ,lJo. {fore, see definition 
1 in IJ.f} 
if A .. is not an element of column title vector, then add 
Ar as an column title and the value of {l, r )-th entry 
is m1r = (m1 1 3 + m123 + ... + ml�oi)fk. Otherwise there 
is a column r' satisfying A ... = Ar, we update mlr' as 
mlr' + (m113 + mhi + ... + ffll1d)/k 
5. for any other entry {x, y)1 define m..,y = 0. 
Obviously we have the unequal formula 
max(mhi,ml2i···•ml�oi) � (ml1i+m!2i+ ..• +ml��;i)/k 
� min(mlli, m12i, ... , ml��:i) ( 8) 
The basic idea of constructing a complete eviden­
tial mapping matrix is that if the causal links from 
ell , e12 .. . , elk to A' are m1li, m121· ... , ml�oi respec-
tively, then the causal link from {eu, e12, ... , e11c} to A' 
is something between max(m1131 m123, ... , ml�oi) and 
min(m11;, m1231 • •• , ml�oJl Here we use the average 
value of m11J", ml2j 1 ••• , m1u· to represent approximate causal link from tell, e12 ... ,elk} to A'. 
It is easy to prove that a CEM is a basic matrix of 
an evidential mapping from 29• to eH. So any piece 
of evidence, which is in the form of bpa on 9 E can 
be propagated to 9 H through the CEM. If a BM is 
the matrix of an multivalued mapping then its related 
CEM is also associated with the same multivalued 
mapping. 
Certainly if a rule in a rule set specifies the causal 
link between a subset E of 9E and A1, ... ,An of 9H, 
then the values of row i, with the row title as E, are 
(f (E -+ A1), ... , f(E -+ An)) in CEM. But these 
f(E-+ A;) must satisfy the condition of ( 8) . 
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5 PROPAGATING BELIEFS 
USING HEURISTIC 
KNOWLEDGE 
Belief propagation in a rule based system as described 
above indicates that, given belief functions on an an­
tecedent frame and a set of rules with rule strengths 
in the form of mass functions, the belief functions on 
the conclusion frame can be deduced. H (R, 9s, 9n), 
(R', 9n, 9k), (R", 9k, 9n), (R11 9E, 9n) and (R2, 
e E I e H) are five triples associated with five eviden­
tial mappings, generally we need to solve the following 
belief propagation problems: 
(i). given a piece of evidence on eE, (R, eE, 9n) is 
known, to deduce belief on en. 
(ii). given a piece of evidence on 9E, (R, ee, 9n), 
and ( R' I e HI en-) are known, to deduce belief on en-. 
(iii). given two pieces of evidence on 9 E and 9E re­
spectively, (R, 9s, 9n) and {R", 9k, 9n) are known, 
to deduce belief on 9 H. 
(iv). given a piece of evidence on 9E, (R1, 9E, 9n) 
and (R2, 9E, 9n) are given independently, to deduce 
belief on en. 
(v). given several pieces of evidence each of which is 
on A,B, ... , C respectively, (R, 9E, 9n) is known 
where 9E=A X Bx ... xc, to deduce belief on en. 
These problems can be solved by the following three 
theorems. 
Theorem 2 Let {R J e E J en) be a triple as.wciated 
with an evidential mapping r•, BM and GEM are the 
basic matrix and the complete evidential mapping ma· 
triz of r• 1 if a mass function m on 9 E is known, then 
a mas.! function m1 on 9H is calculated by the formula 
(ml(H1) ... m1(Hm)] = (m(E! ) ... m(E,)] x GEM (9) 
where [E11 ••• ,En] is the row title vector of GEM, and 
[H1, ... , Hm} is the column title vector of GEM. 
Specifically, if m is a Bayesian subjective probability 
assignment then m1 on 9 H is calculated by 
(ml(Hl) ... mt(Hm)] = (m(el) ... m(en)] X GEM 
Theorem S Let {R, 9E, 9n} and {R', 9n, en) be 
two triples associated with two evidential mappings r· 
and r'*, CEM1 and CEM2 are two complete evidential 
mapping matriCeS of r* and r'* 1 if a maSS function m 
on 9 E is known, then a mass function m1 on 6u is 
calculated by the formula 
[mt(HD .. . m,(H!,.)] = (m(Et) ... m(En)] x GEM 
where CEM=CEM1 x CEM2. 
Theorem 3 indicates that if we know a series of evi­
dential mappings from 9E1 to 9E., ... , from 9s,._1 
to e E,. and those CEM; of evidential mappings from 
9E; to 9Ei+l fori = 1, ... ,n- 1, then we will get an 
evidential mapping from eE. to eE .. with its CEM as 
CEM1x ... xCEMn-l· 
Theorems 2 and 3 can be used to solve problems (i) 
and (ii). Dempster's combination rule is used to deal 
with the problem in (iii) where we suppose that any 
two pieces of evidence bearing on the same frame are 
DS�independent (Voorbraak1991). DS�independence 
will guarantee that if we use Dempster's rule to com­
bine two probability distributions we should obtain the 
same result as what we get from Bayesian theory. 
Theorem 4. Let {Rl,eE,eH) and {R2,eE, en) be 
two triples associated with two evidential mappings r· 
and r'* 1 m; and m� are two mass function.! indicating 
cau.!al links from e, to en in r· and r·· respectively 
(for i = 1 ,  ... , n), that is 
r* (e,) = {(H,1, f(e,-+ Hil)), ... , 
(H;n•1 f(ei-+ Hin•))} 
m;(A;,) == f(e,-+ H;,) 
where A., = {(x, y)lx E ..,{e.} or y E H,,} for l = 1, 
. .. , n' 
and 
r'*(ei) = {(HI11 f(e,-+ Hid), ... , 
(HJ"H' f(ei-+ Hfn•))} 
mHA�r) = /(ei -+ H�r} 
where A�r = {(x,y)lx E ..,{e,} or y E H!r} for r = 1, 
... , n" 
then the joint impact of two evidential mappings is the 
third evidential mapping r" • from 9 E to 9 H in which: 
r"*{ei) = {{H" n, f(ei -+ H" n)}, ... , 
(H" ik1 f (e, -+ H",�c))} {10} 
m;(A" ii) = f(e• -+ H" ,,.) = m; e mHA" •.;) for 
i = 1, ... ,k  
where A" ij = Au n A�r• and H" ij =H., n HI,.· 
Here e indicates that Dempster's rule is used to com­
bine m; and m! . 
The meaning of this theorem is that if there are two 
independent heuristic rule sets (as in figure 1) given 
by different domain experts respectively, each of those 
specifies one kind of causal link from frame e E to 
frame 9y, then the joint impact of the two causal 
links can be substituted by the third heuristic rule set 




Figure 1: Two evidential mappings from e to h. 
Here we need to address the issue that the meaning of 
this theorem is different from using theorem 2 twice 
through two evidential mappings. Using theorem 2 in 
that way gives a wrong result because of the depen­
dency of two mass functions On e H. 
For problem (v), given a triple of an evidential map­
ping (R, eE, eH). eE=A X Bx . . .  xc, and a series 
of evidence in the form of mass functions on A, B, . .. , 
C respectively, we must first get the joint mass func­
tion on 9 E in order to obtain the impact of those 
pieces of evidence on eH. Shafer's partition theory 
and technique (Shafer 1976, Shafer, Shenoy and Mel­
louli 1987; Shafer and Logan 1987) provide a sound 
background for propagating mass functions (or belief 
functions) from A, B, ... , C to their Cartesian product 
frame of discernment e E. Thus applying theorem 2 
the mass function on e H will be calculated. Certainly 
computational complexity is a major problem which 
has been widely researched (Barnett 1981, Shafer and 
Logan 1987). 
Generally speaking, when eE =A X B X ••• X c, we 
can solve problem (v) by following steps: 
1) establishing evidential mappings fA, f B , .•• , f G (in 
fact they are multivalued mappings) from A, B, .. . , C 
to 9 E respectively. 
f A(ai) = {({ai} X B X •.. XC, 1)} for each� in A 
f B (bi) = {(A X {bi} X ••. X C, 1)} for each b, in B 
(11) 
f0(ci) ={(A X B X •. . X {c1}, 1)} for each c1 inC 
2) given a series of pieces of evidence on A, B, . . .  , C, 
based on those evidential mappings, geting a number 
of mass functions on the joint frame from each simple 
frame. 
3) suppose A, B, ... , C are different from each other 
and the pieces of evidence are independent, using 
Dempster's combination rule to get the final mass 
function on 9 E. 
4) so based on this final mass function on 9 E and an 
evidential mapping associated with (R, S,e, SH), ap­
plying theorem 2 eventually to deduce a mass function 
on 9H. 
6 CONCLUSION 
6.1 RELATED WORK 
Several approaches to dealing with heuristic knowledge 
in the Dempster-Shafer theory of evidence have been 
proposed (Ginsberg 1984, Liu 1986, Yen 1988, Hau 
and Kashyap 1990). Pearl also mentions this prob­
lem in Pearl (1990). The approach proposed in this 
paper is different from those approaches among which 
Liu's approach and Yen's approach are two proper sub­
sets of our evidential mappings. In Ginsberg's as well 
as in Hau and Kashyap's representation formalisms of 
heuristic rules, a rule is associated with a pair of real 
numbers between [0,1] in the form of 
if E then H with uncertainty [c, d]. 
The meaning of c and d defined by Ginsberg is: c is 
the extent to which we believe a given proposition to 
be confirmed by the available evidence, and d is the 
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extent to which it is disconfirmed. 
That is: E ---+ H with c and E ---+ -,H with d. 
While Hau and Kashyap gave two explanations: 
1. c is the credibility to which E supports H, dis the 
plausibility to which E supports H, so 1 - d is the 
degree to which E supports -,H. 
That is E --+ H with c and E ---+ H with 1 - d. 
2. Let e = eE E9 eH where eE and eH are frames 
of discernment of E and H, then c and d form a mass 
function on e 
m(A) = c, m(-,A) = 1- d, and m(9) 
= 
d- c. 
where A= {(x,y)lzE-,E or yEH} 
Obviously Ginsberg's representation can be incorpo­
rated into an evidential mapping from 8 E to 8 H by 
the rule set R below. 
R: E-+ H (c)i E---+ -.H (a)i E---+ Sy <1-.t-cJ. 
-.E---+ 9y (ll. 
Hau and Kashyap's first explanation can also be incor­
porated into an evidential mapping from 9 E to 9 H by 
the rule set R' 
R': E---+ H (c)i E---+ •H (1-d)i E---+ 8H <<�-cJ • 
-.E---+ 8H <1J. 
In fact the second explanation given by Hau and 
Kashyap is to construct a mass function (furthermore 
a belief function) on a joint frame of discernment. Sim­
ilar explanations of a. rule are adopted by Laskey and 
Lehner (1989), by Lowrance et al (1986), and by Zarley 
et al (1988). This is also consistent with our explana­
tion in section 2.2. 
In section 5 we only discuss one situation involving the 
dependency problem. Hau and Kashyap (1990) dis­
cussed several situations based on their representation 
of heuristic rules. 
6.2 SUMMARY 
Evidential mappings are the main concept proposed in 
this paper. The extended Dempster-Shafer theory is 
more powerful for propagating beliefs and at the same 
time keeps all the features of the original theory. The 
following are main features in our approach: 1). rep­
resenting uncertain relations between evidence spaces 
and hypothesis spaces by evidential mappings; 2). by 
creating evidential mappings for incomplete heuristic 
rule sets, more heuristic knowledge can be represented 
in D-S theory; 3). by constructing complete evidential 
mapping matrices any piece of evidence bearing on an 
evidence space can be propagated to the corresponding 
hypothesis space; 4). when a set of heuristic rules is de­
tailed enough to form a Bayesian multi-valued causal 
link model, any result produced by Bayesian inference 
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can also be carried out by D-S theory under eviden­
tial mappings; 5) .  evidential mappings are consistent 
with other previous research work in this respect; 6) . 
a series of belief propagation procedures are easily de­
duced based on evidential mappings. 
Heuristic knowledge is important in knowledge based 
systems. Representing this kind of knowledge and 
propagating beliefs are the main and the most diffi­
cult tasks for designers of knowledge based systems. 
This paper makes some progress in this area. Future 
work concerning evidential mappings in the Dempster­
Shaler theory should focus on exploring more features 
of evidential mappings and more approaches to dealing 
with dependency relations. 
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